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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
C. DEAN LARSEN, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Supreme Court No. 920114 
Court of Appeals No. 900473-CA 
Category No. 14 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ARGUMENT 
I. Scienter is an Independent Element of a Criminal 
Violation of Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 
The State does not question the decree of Utah's 
legislature that a "general purpose" of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act is to coordinate the interpretation of the Utah 
Act with the related federal regulation. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-27. Further, the State presents nothing to dispute that a 
violation of Rule 10b-5, the model for what became Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1, requires proof of scienter. Finally, the State never 
questions, from a policy view, the importance of the scienter 
requirement and the significance of aligning the construction of 
Section 61-1-1 with federal court interpretation of Rule L0b-5. 
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Nonetheless, the State urges the Court to ignore the 
independent scienter element of Rule 10b-5 in construing section 
61-1-1. The State argues that the unrelated congressional intent 
of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q, which does not 
require scienter, should be substituted for the legislative 
intent for § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, which was 
the enabling statute for Rule 10b-5, and which requires scienter. 
State's br. at 12-20. The State suggests alternatively that 
because neither the term "scienter" nor its components are 
expressly enumerated among the terms of sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-
21, the Court should not recognize the independent scienter element 
of Rule 10b-5, which was the pattern for section 101 of the 
Uniform Securities Act and, in turn, for section 61-1-1. The 
State's arguments ignore the purpose of the Utah Act and 
misconstrue the Supreme Court's decisions. 
A. Section 61-1-1 Is Based On Rule 10b-5, Not on 
Section 17(a) 
The State does not question that a violation of § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 requires proof of scienter, as the Court in Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201, 212-14 (1976) 
explained.1 Yet, the State charges that Mr. Larsen "erroneously 
xThe State implies that because Hochfelder was a civil 
action, the scienter element would not apply in a criminal 
prosecution. States br. at 7. However, that Hochfelder was a 
civil and not criminal case, is not significant as the Supreme 
Court explained: "In our view, the rational of Hochfelder 
( c o n t i n u e d . . . ) 
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views Hochfelder in isolation" and fails to give "due weight" to 
one other Supreme Court case, Aaron v. S.E.C., which discussed 
separately § 17(a) and Rule 10b-5. State's br. at 13. The State 
reasons this way: because language for Rule 10b-5 was borrowed in 
part from § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, then the intent of § 17(a)(2), 
as defined in Aaron, must govern or be "at least as instructive" 
as the Hochfelder ruling, in construing Rule lQb-5, the model for 
what became section 61-1-1 of the Utah Act. State's br. at 14-
16. Then, citing only the portion of Aaron that analyzes § 
17(a), the State concludes that "the Supreme Court case law 
interpreting related federal regulation" does not dictate that 
section 61-1-1 be construed to require proof of scienter. 
State's br. at 15.2 
1(...continued) 
ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element 
of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the 
identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought." 
Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980). 
2The State now employs the phrase "interpreting related 
federal regulation" which closely resembles the important 
language of purpose in section 61-1-27, leaving the incorrect 
impression that § 17(a) is "the" federal regulation related to 
section 61-1-1. State's br. at 15. The State builds on this 
misconception, stating that § 17(a), "through rule 10b-5 was a model 
for section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act and therefore 
section 61-1-1." State's br. at 16 (emphasis supplied). 
Contrary to the impression left by these carefully worded 
statements, the truth is that Rule 10b-5 alone, and not § 17(a) 
of the 1933 Act, is the federal regulation related to section 61-
1-1. See Uniform Securities Act § 101, Official Comment, 
reprinted in Louis B. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities 
Act, 6 (1976); Petitioners br. at 7-10. 
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Unmasked, the State's argument is an attempt to switch 
the congressional intent of § 10(b) of 1934 Act (and thus, of 
Rule 10b-5), with the very different intent of § 17(a)(2) of the 
1933 Act. However, the State's syllogism is defective and 
misconstrues the Supreme Court decisions; here, the eye is 
quicker than the hand. 
1. Aaron v. S.E.C. 
Apart from the inherent defect in logic in the State's 
position,3 Aaron does not condone the State's intent-switching 
analysis. The Aaron court confirmed that the intent of Rule 10b-5 
is discerned from the language and congressional intent § 10(b), 
the statute under which Rule 10b-5 was promulgated. Aaron, 446 
U.S. at 691 ("since the Commission's rule-making power was 
necessarily limited by the ambit of its statutory authority, the 
rHochfelderl Court reasoned that Rule 10b-5 must likewise be 
restricted to conduct involving scienter.") (emphasis supplied). 
See also Petitioner's br. at 7-10. 
3It does not follow that by borrowing language from 
§ 17(a)(2) (a statute allowing prosecution without proof of 
scienter), for use in Rule 10b-5 (a rule promulgated under a 
statute requiring proof of scienter), that the legislative intent 
of § 17(a) would somehow override known congressional intent for 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Moreover, the different intents of § 
10(b) and § 17(a) are incompatible; they cannot be combined to 
form a useful guide for interpretation. The State's argument, 
which ignores congressional intent for Rule 10b-5, fails to 
reconcile this. 
-4-
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The Aaron Court, like the Court in Hochfelder, 
construed Rule 10b-5 without substituting the legislative intent 
of § 17(a)(2), as the State does. State's br. at 14-16. See 
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 689-91; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197-214. 
Similarly, the Aaron Court construed § 17(a) independently, 
according to its own legislative history and language. Aaron, 
446 U.S. at 695-700. The Supreme Court found no "expression of 
congressional intent in the legislative history" of § 17(a) that 
scienter was required under § 17(a)(2) and (3). Id., at 697.A 
On the other hand, the Aaron Court reaffirmed that the 
legislative history and plain meaning of the language of § 10(b), 
and the structure of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, show that scienter 
is an element of a Rule 10b-5 violation. JEd. at 690-91, 695 
("the controlling precedent here is . . . Hochfelder. 
Accordingly, we conclude that scienter is a necessary element of 
a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"). 
In short, contrary to the State's contention, the 
Supreme Court cases construing the intent of Rule 10b-5 and § 
17(a), including Aaron (and Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983), 
which the State overlooks), do not authorize switching the 
congressional intent of § 17(a) with the intent of § 10(b) to 
AThe Court, however, in determining the intent necessary to 
warrant injunctive relief, went on to note that "[t]his is not to 
say, however, that scienter has no bearing at all on whether a 
district court should enjoin a person violating or about to 
violate § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)." Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697, 701. 
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construe Rule 10b-5 and provisions patterned after it such as 
section 61-1-1.5 
2. The State's Authorities 
This is unchanged by other decisions the State cites. 
Neither State v. Tembv, 108 Wis. 2d 521, 528-29, 322 N.W.2d 522, 
526-27 (1982) nor People v. Whitlow, 89 111. 2d 322, 324-35, 433 
N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982), which construed "61-1-1(2)-type" 
provisions, even cite Rule 10b-5, yet alone construe it with the 
intent of § 17(a). State's br. at 16. Tembv, which does not 
mention section 101 of the Uniform Act, implies that the court 
relied on § 17(a) as a model for Wisconsin simply based on 
language similarity. 322 N.E.2d at 526 n.l. Whitlow is no 
different. 433 N.E.2d at 633-34 (the court concluded that 
§ 17(a) is "closely analogous" to the statute at issue). These 
cases say nothing of congressional intent in applying Rule 10b-5. 
The same is true of the State's remaining authorities. 
State's br. at 17-18. As previously explained, many of these 
state decisions are based on statutes lacking the legislative 
purpose that guides construction of section 61-1-1 of the Utah 
Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27; Petitioner's br. at 13-14. 
5The State also attempts to divert Court attention from the 
congressional intent underlying Rule 10b-5 by picking at Rule 
lOb-5, noting that it was "hastily drafted," and discounting 
Hochfelder, saying that the Supreme Court did not "thoroughly 
analyze" the language of Rule 10b-5, all as though congressional 
intent were not at issue. State's Br. at 14. 
-6-
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Other decisions make no mention of section 101 of the Uniform 
Securities Act, of the legislative intent of Rule 10b-5 and of 
Hochfelder. Petitioner's br. at 13-14.6 Thus, while such 
decisions, which collide with Hochfelder, may provide useful 
authority to construe laws based upon § 17(a), they do not assist 
states like Utah where the statutory counterpart is Rule lQb-5. 
See State v. Puckett, 6 Kan. App. 2d 688, 634 P.2d 144 (1981), 
aff'd, 230 Kan. 296, 640 P.2d 1198 (1982); People v. Terranova, 
38 Colo. App. 476, 563 P.2d 363, 365-66 (1977). 
The State also cites United States v. Chiarella, 588 
F.2d 1358, 1370 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), and 
United States v. Charnav, 537 F.2d 341, 351-52 (7th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976), implying that these cases reject 
the scienter element in Rule 10b-5 prosecutions. State's br. at 
19.7 This argument is defective on two counts: First, the 
State artificially narrows its definition (and analysis) of 
6Even the State appears to agree that the persuasiveness 
here of such state court decisions depends on the applicability 
of Hochfelder. State's br. at 18 (arguing that while the state 
court decisions it cites may conflict with Hochfelder, Hochfelder 
should not be viewed as "controlling authority"). And, the State 
does not reconcile the divergent analyses of these cases with the 
plain legislative purpose of the Utah Act and the known 
legislative intent of Rule 10b-5, the ultimate model for section 
61-1-1. 
7The court in Charnav relied on pre-Hochfelder authority 
which, to the extent it did not require proof of scienter, now is 
of little value. 537 F.2d at 351-52; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 
212-14. 
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"scienter" to "the intent to defraud." State's br. at 5-6 n.2. 
Such intent is only one alternative proof requirement of the 
scienter element in a Rule 10b-5 prosecution. See Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (scienter embraces the "intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud"). 
Second, and contrary to what the State implies, 
Chiarella does not retreat from the scienter requirement of 
Hochfelder. Chiarella held that the trial court's instruction 
omitting intent to defraud was proper where the trial court chose 
instead to instruct the jury that it must not find the opposite 
of such intent; i.e., that the defendant acted deliberately, "and 
not as a result of 'innocent mistakes, negligence, or 
inadvertence or other innocent conduct.'" 588 F.2d at 1370 
(emphasis supplied). The effect is synonymous. 
By requiring the jury to find that Chiarella's conduct 
did not result from negligence or other innocent conduct, the 
Chiarella court only told the jury that it could not convict if 
the accused acted in good faith — the converse of intent to 
defraud. This instruction, like the instruction in United States 
v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd, 947 
F.2d 551 (2nd Cir. 1991), was a proper alternative scienter 
instruction. See Dirks , 463 U.S. 646, 674 n.ll (1983) (Blackman, 
J. dissenting) ("Moreover, if the insider in good faith does not 
bel ieve that the information is material or non-public, he also 
-8-
188\289fi1.1 
lacks the necessary scienter. In fact, the scienter requirement 
functions in part to protect good faith errors of this type 
(citations omitted)).8 
Unlike the jury charge given in Chiarella, Mr. Larsen's 
instruction on good faith was refused. See Larsen's Requested 
Instr. No. 30 (R.1381).9 And, the alternative definitions of 
the scienter element, including the components of good faith 
provided in Chiarella, were not instructed, contrary to the 
State's contention. State's br. at 19 (saying that Chiarella 
upheld jury instructions "similar" to those given at Mr. Larsen's 
trial). The jury here was told that it could find a violation of 
8After citing Chiarella and Chestman, which confirm that a 
Rule 10b-5 violation cannot be predicated on innocent mistake, 
negligence or inadvertence, the State inconsistently argues that 
"a good faith defense is not applicable." State's br. at 21. 
This ignores the controlling Supreme Court decisions. See 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212 n.31; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 674 n.ll. 
The State's citation to the pre-Hochfelder case Sparrow v. United 
States, 402 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1968) and United States v„ Bover, 
694 F.2d 58, 60 (3rd Cir. 1982), offer no help. Sparrow was 
overruled by Hochfelder to the extent it rejected a good faith 
defense. See 425 U.S. at 211 n.31; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 674 n.ll. 
Bover recognized scienter as "the substantive element of the 
offense." 694 F.2d at 60. The scienter requirement functions in 
part "to protect good faith errors." Dirks, 463 U.S. at 674 
n.ll. 
9This refusal, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the 
jury concerning the independent element of scienter, was 
reversible error. See State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 
1991) (the absence of an instruction on all elements necessary to 
convict is "reversible error as a matter of law.") Mr. Larsen's 
requested (but refused) instructions, which cited Hochfelder, 
were plainly "sufficient to apprise the court of the theory of 
defense." Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo. 1984); 
Larsen's Requested Instr. Nos. 4, 5, 30 (R. 1353-56, 1381). 
-9-
section 61-1-1 with proof of "willfulness" alone and that only 
ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves that intent was a 
defense. Jury Instr. Nos. 14, 17, 17A (R. 1309, 1312-13). And, 
while willfulness is an element of proof for a criminal violation 
of Section 61-1-1 (as it is for Rule 10b-5, 15 U.S.C. § 77x), it 
does not encompass the separate element of scienter. Dirks, 463 
U.S. at 663 n.23 (Scienter "is an independent element of a Rule 
10b-5 violation.") (emphasis supplied).10 
3. The Legislative Purpose of Section 61-1-1 
The State chides Mr. Larsen for acknowledging a simple 
truth: to effectuate the general legislative purpose of the Utah 
Act — "to coordinate the interpretation and administration of 
this chapter with the related federal regulation" — the Utah Act 
and the related federal law "must" be similarly construed. State 
br. at 9-10, 18-19; § 61-1-1. The State does not explain how 
otherwise to interpret the Utah Act and related federal law to 
fulfill this purpose. And, while the State contends that Utah 
10This refutes the State's claim that the only culpable 
mental state required to establish securities fraud is 
"wilfully." State's br. at 16-17. Because no additional mental 
element is contained in the "plain language" of the statute, the 
State argues, no additional element is necessary. State's br. at 
7-8. Section 61-1-21 requires that a person act wilfully before 
criminal penalties arise. The related federal legislation 
contains a very similar provision requiring that a person act 
"wilfully" before a criminal penalty may be imposed. See 15 
U.S.C. § 77x. However, as previously explained, the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that a showing of scienter is 
a separate and independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation. 
Aaron 446 U.S. at 690-91. 
-10-
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courts are "free" to disregard the interpretation of the related 
federal regulation (State's br. at 19), the Court is guided in 
construing section 61-1-1 by "[t]he primary rule of statutory 
interpretation [which] is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve." Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991) 
(emphasis supplied). In short, the State's reliance on § 17(a) 
and cases construing § 17(a) instead of Rule 10b-5, is unfounded. 
B. Scienter is an Independent Element 
The State argues alternatively that congressional 
intent making scienter an element of Rule 10b-5, and the 
legislative purpose of the Utah Act should be ignored because the 
"plain language" of sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21, read in 
isolation, seem to allow prosecution without proof of 
scienter.11 State's br. at 7-10. As previously discussed, the 
State's argument ignores the congressional intent of the model 
for section 61-1-1 and it defeats the purpose of the Utah Act. 
uSpecifically, the State says that nothing in the language 
"gives rise to an intent to defraud element," again incorrectly 
limiting its definition of scienter to suit its analysis. 
State's br. at 7. Employing this narrow definition, the State 
cites several statutes containing the phrase "intent to defraud" 
and concludes that Utah's legislature never required proof of 
such intent unless the phrase "intent to defraud" expressly 
appears. State's br. at 10. However, even if this "survey" 
would permit the inference intended by the State, the inference 
cannot carry to the actual, broader definition of scienter the 
State ignores. See, e.g., Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. 
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The Supreme Court in Hochfelder rejected a similar 
argument. The Securities and Exchange Commission argued that 
Rule 10b-5(b) and (c) (with language like section 6-1-1(2) and 
(3)), standing alone, could encompass intentional and negligent 
conduct. 425 U.S. at 212. The Hochfelder Court, however, held 
that scienter "is an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 
violation." Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23 (citing to Hochfelder) 
(emphasis supplied). This interpretation is based largely upon 
the congressional intent of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the enabling 
legislation for Rule 10b-5. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201 (§ 10(b) 
was intended by Congress to address "practices that involve some 
element of scienter . . . " ) ; Aaron, 446 U.S. at 691. The scope 
of Rule 10b-5 does not exceed the power granted by Congress under 
§ 10(b). 446 U.S. at 691. Thus, even though the language of 
Rule 10b-5(b), like section 61-1-1(2), when viewed alone, could 
be "read as prescribing . . . any type of material misstatement 
or omission, and any course of conduct, that has the effect of 
defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or 
not," Hochfelder, 4 25 U.S. at 212, violations were intended to 
require proof of scienter. Ld. See also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 700 
("In the absence of a conflict between reasonably plain meaning 
and legislative history, the words of the statute must prevail.") 
(emphasis supplied). 
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This interpretation is consistent with considerations 
of policy that the State overlooks. Petitioner's brief at 16-18. 
Even in the context of a civil action, the Supreme Court in 
Hochfelder was troubled that by accepting the view that scienter 
was unnecessary, the Court "would extend to new frontiers the 
'hazards' of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising 
serious policy questions not yet addressed by Congress." 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 n.33. The Hochfelder court noted 
that it was not "the first court to express concern that the 
inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in 
this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than 
good." Jd. The scienter requirement abates these significant 
concerns. 
While the State does not question these concerns, it 
denies that the interpretation it urges has a strict liability 
effect. State's br. at 21. However, other courts correctly 
recognize that the State's position imposes "a form of strict 
liability." People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich. App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 
304, 308 (1989), citing Van Duvse v. Israel, 486 F. Supp. 1382, 
1387 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (emphasis removed). 
Section 61-1-1 was patterned after Rule 10(b)-5, "the 
logical model" for the Uniform Act. Louis B. Loss, Commentary on 
the Uniform Securities Act, 7 (1976). By adopting the Uniform 
Act, Utah's legislature made possible "the interchangeability of 
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judicial precedents in this important area." See Wallace F. 
Bennett, Securities Regulation in Utah; A Recap of History and 
the New Uniform Act, 1963 Utah L. Rev, 216, 232 n.112. This is 
plainly contemplated by the express purpose of the Uniform Act — 
"to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this 
chapter with the related federal regulation." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 6-1-27. Federal court interpretation of Rule 10b-5 should 
apply to section 61-1-1 in order to advance this purpose. Id.12 
II. The Court of Appeals Misapplied the Law Concerning 
Expert Witness Testimony 
A. The Court of Appeal's Reliance on Lueben is 
Mistaken 
The State concedes that in reviewing the trial court's 
decision to admit Sherwood Cook's testimony, the "Court of 
Appeals relied heavily" on United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d 179 
(5th Cir. 1987) ("Lueben I").13 Indeed, Lueben I forms the 
12The State's reliance on cases construing provisions other 
than section 61-1-1 is flawed first because the intent for 
section 61-1-1 is found in its express legislative purpose and 
known model which requires scienter, not in the language of the 
different statutes these cases construe. See State v. Delmotte, 
665 P.2d 1314, 1325 (Utah 1983) (construing bad check statute); 
State v. Berowerff, 777 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah App. 1989) 
(construing arson statute). And, again the State incorrectly 
limits its scienter analysis to cases addressing only "intent to 
defraud." State's br. at 8-9. 
13The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's ruling 
under a "clear showing of abuse" standard. State v. Larsen, 828 
P.2d 487, 492 (Utah App. 1992). This standard of review 
apparently accorded even greater deference to the trial court's 
decision than the simple abuse-of-discretion standard advanced by 
(continued...) 
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basis for the Court of Appeals' opinion. Yet, the entire 
analysis in Lueben I adopted by the Court of Appeals was vacated 
by United States v. Lueben, 816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987) 
("Lueben II"). The State, by footnote, says that Lueben II was 
just a "modification" that "did not appear to disturb the 
substance" of Lueben I because it did not openly "criticize" the 
stricken analysis. State's br. at 25 n. 6. The truth is, by 
vacating that section of its prior decision, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit leveled ultimate 
criticism. 
However, even if Lueben I had not been vacated, 
admitting Mr. Cook's testimony was improper under its analysis. 
The State characterizes Mr. Cook's testimony, not as a legal 
opinion, but "more akin to the opinion testimony on the factual 
question discussed in Lueben." State's br. at 27. This notion 
is refuted by comparing the testimony proffered in Lueben with 
Mr. Cook's sworn remarks. 
13
 ( . . . continued) 
the State. State's br. at 28. In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991), the Court implied that in reviewing a 
decision admitting evidence, the standard of review is higher 
than simple abuse of discretion: "[w]hether a piece of evidence 
is admissible is a question of law, and we always review 
questions of law under a correctness standard," granting the 
trial court "some discretion." Under either standard, the trial 
court's incorrect decision falls beyond the realm of proper 
discretion. 
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The defendant in Lueben offered expert testimony 
concerning how savings and loan associations make real estate 
loans. 812 F.2d at 183. Out of the jury's hearing, the expert 
testified in substance that in making the type of loans at issue, 
a savings and loan association would look only to the value of 
the property securing the loan without considering the borrower's 
income, employment or net worth. Id. See also United States v. 
Lueben, 838 F.2d 751, 754 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) (appeal on remand). 
The court found that "[t]he clear inference from this testimony is 
that the false financial statements and income tax returns 
supplied by Lueben were not 'material' to the savings and loan 
associations' decision to make the loans to Lueben." 812 F.2d at 
183 (emphasis added). The expert did not say that any particular 
facts were or were not "material." 
The Lueben Court first explained that "an expert may 
not express a conclusion of law," and that such conclusions were 
correctly excluded in Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, 770 F.2d 1303 
(5th Cir. 1985), where the court held that an expert's answers to 
hypothetical questions would simply tell the jury what result to 
reach, allowing the expert to voice a legal conclusion concerning 
the proximate cause of the claimed injuries. j[d. at 184. The 
court then contrasted the proffered testimony of Lueben's expert 
with the impermissible testimony in Ashland and another case, 
Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983), which 
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upheld the exclusion of expert testimony on the legal cause of an 
accident, explaining the difference this way: 
[W]e think that [the expert's] testimony 
falls within the permissible fact-oriented 
question. Lueben sought to ask [the expert] 
the factual question of whether the false 
statements in this case would have "the 
capacity to influence" a loan officer . . . 
not the legal question of whether the 
statements were "material." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The fact-oriented testimony proffered in Lueben 
contrasts sharply with the legal opinion given by Mr. Cook: 
Q. Mr. Cook, let's take a situation where you have a 
limited partnership and there is an asset such as 
an interest in another limited partnership that is 
valued at approximately $175,000 that is given to 
the general partner by another individual in order 
to indemnify the general partner against his 
losses that he might incur as general partner of 
that limited partnership. Now, do you have an 
opinion as to whether or not in the offering 
documents those facts ought to be . . . disclosed 
in an offering document similar to that one? 
A. Yes, I would consider that material information. . 
Q. Let me put this question to you. Again, assume 
that you are looking at a limited partnership and 
a Private Placement Memorandum, and there was an 
investment manager that was supposed to make sure 
that certain criteria were fulfilled before loans 
were made from the limited partnership funds. And 
assume, if you will, that the investment manager 
never met, never operated, never exercised his 
prerogative or made a recommendation, would you 
want those facts disclosed in a disclosure 
document to investors. 
A. Objection. . . . (off the record discussion 
between Court and counsel). 
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Q. Mr. Cook, do you remember the facts and the 
hypothetical situation? 
A. Would you ask it again? 
Q. Let's suppose you were examining the limited 
partnership in which there is an investment 
manager that will make certain recommendations as 
to how money is going to be used from the limited 
partnership, specifically regarding certain loan 
criteria. And let's assume also that the 
investment manager never functioned, never made 
those recommendations and, in fact, ever met. 
Would you want those facts disclosed in a 
disclosure document to investors? 
A. Yes, that would also be material. 
(Transcript Vol. VI at 87-91)(emphasis added). 
Thus, unlike the expert in Lueben, Mr. Cook did not 
just testify that certain information "would have the capacity to 
influence." Compare, Lueben, 812 F.2d at 184. Mr. Cook told 
the jury that the information was "material" and should have been 
disclosed. (Transcript Vol. VI at 87-91). In effect he told the 
jury that Mr. Larsen was guilty.14 
14
 Cook's conclusions also reveal that the Court of Appeals' 
remark that Mr. Cook used the term "material" in a "factual 
sense" is unfounded. State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah 
App. 1992). Cook's testimony confirms that Mr. Cook, the lawyer 
and securities regulator, used the term "material" as an improper 
legal conclusion, basing his opinions on hypothetical facts. See 
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808-09 n.5 (10th Cir. 1988), 
cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1068 (1989). (Error to allow attorney-
expert witness to testify as to legal conclusions. "The expert in 
the instant case did not testify on issues of fact because he 
based his opinions on hypothetical facts. The expert added 
nothing to resolve the salient factual issues.") And the State 
does not question that as both an attorney and top securities 
regulator who had previously investigated Mr. Larsen, the error 
(continued...) 
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Lueben I condemned such testimony. JCci. at 184, citing 
Ashland, 770 F.2d at 1311 ("[T]he expert's answers to 
hypothetical questions posed in that case would simply tell the 
jury what result to reach and would allow the expert to voice a 
legal conclusion.") In sum, even under the vacated Lueben I 
analysis upon which the Court of Appeals depends, the Court of 
Appeals' decision condoning the admission of Cook's testimony was 
incorrect. 
Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals mistaken reliance 
on Lueben I, the State attempts to justify the result of the 
court's decision, suggesting that Mr. Cook's testimony is 
admissible under State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991) (expert 
opined that fire had been intentionally set), United States v. 
Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986) (officer of Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms allowed to testify that a device 
was a firearm subject to registration with the Bureau), and 
United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1981) (expert 
testified that funds were wrongfully taken from corporation). 
State's br. at 28. However, the court in Scop v. United Statesf 
846 F.2d 135, modified on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988), 
made an important distinction between such cases, where experts 
14( . . .continued) 
of allowing Mr. Cook's testimony was so prejudicial that it could 
not have been corrected. 853 F.2d at 808; Marx & Co., Inc. v. 
Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir), cert, denied, 434 
U.S. 861 (1971). 
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had been allowed to testify as to certain legal conclusions, and 
cases like this, 846 F.2d at 141, citing, e.g., United States v. 
Young, 745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1084 
(1985) (police detective allowed to testify that narcotics 
transaction had taken place). The Scop court explained that the 
testimony in cases like those cited here by the State, though 
perhaps still offensive, was permissible because it did not 
repeatedly use statutory or regulatory language indicating guilt. 
Scopf 846 F.2d at 141-42. 
[T]elling the jury that a defendant acted as a 
"steerer" or participated in a narcotics transaction 
differs from opining that the defendant "possessed 
narcotics, to wit, heroin, with the intent to sell," 
or "aided and abetted the possession of heroin with 
intent to sell," the functional equivalent of Whitten's 
testimony in a drug case. 
Id. at 142. This distinction exists here. Mr. Cook, as 
explained above, did not simply testify that certain information 
could influence investors. He recited the key statutory term and 
said the information was "material." 
B. Scop Provides Correct Analysis 
The State attempts to distinguish Cook's testimony from 
the testimony condemned in Scop, Adalman13 and Marx16. Yet, the 
State does not question the correctness of the rule these cases 
I3Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
16Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d 
Cir. ) cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977). 
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establish, or that cases of alleged securities fraud pose unique 
difficulties when testimony like Mr. Cook's is admitted, as Scop, 
Marx and Adalman explain. See Petitioner's br. at 20-23. The 
State simply concludes that these cases do not apply because Mr. 
Cook's testimony, "while it would have been better for [him] to 
steer away from the term 'material'", was free of "legal 
opinion." State's br. at 27. However, compared with Cook's 
testimony, the context and the testimony held improper in Scop 
seem indistinguishable. 
The defendants in Scop were prosecuted for mail fraud, 
securities fraud and conspiracy. The government's expert witness 
was the chief investigator over for the SEC regional office and 
had been a stockbroker for eight years prior to joining the SEC. 
He also had personally spent over one thousand hours working on 
the Scop case. 846 F.2d at 138. Like Mr. Cook, who testified of 
his participation in a previous securities investigation of Mr. 
Larsen (Transcript Vol. VI at 47-52, Appendix E), the Scop expert 
did not testify as a witness with personal knowledge of relevant 
events. He testified as an expert in securities trading 
practices, purportedly basing his testimony only on the testimony 
and documentary evidence introduced at trial. 846 F.2d at 138. 
When the expert was asked whether there was a scheme to defraud 
investors, he was allowed to answer: "It is my opinion that the 
stock . . . was manipulated and that certain individuals were 
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active participants and material participants in the manipulation 
of that stock . . . .M Id. The Scop Court held that the 
expert's "repeated statements embodying legal conclusions 
exceeded the permissible bounds of opinion testimony" under the 
rules of evidence, noting that he drew directly upon the language 
of the statute concerning "manipulation" and "fraud." Jld.. at 
138, 140. 
Cook's testimony was no different. Mr. Cook's repeated 
statements embodied legal conclusions that certain information 
was "material"; it drew directly upon the language of the statute 
(see Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989)); it exceeded the permissible 
scope of expert opinion testimony. The trial court's decision 
admitting this testimony was incorrect and beyond the proper 
bounds of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and trial court and remand for 
new trial. 
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